A new strategy of criminal prosecution, called "community prosecution," emerged in the past two decades. The strategy breaks with the traditional approach to prosecution in which a prosecutor works in an office adjacent to a criminal court, processes a large volume of cases, and measures success with conviction rates and sentence lengths. In community prosecution, a prosecutor works directly in a neighborhood, develops relationships with local groups, aligns enforcement priorities with residents' public safety concerns, and seeks solutions to prevent crime. This article presents the first estimates of community prosecution's impact on crime. Over a fifteen-year period, Chicago's top prosecutor twice applied the community prosecution strategy in some (but not all) neighborhoods, and this sequence of two "off/on" policy episodes permits plausible identification of the strategy's impact. Differences-in-differences estimates show that community prosecution reduced certain categories of crime, such as aggravated assault, but had no effect on other categories, such as larceny. The diversity of practices under the rubric of community prosecution makes generalization difficult, but the The author thanks
Introduction
The traditional view of a criminal prosecutor is a legal advocate who seeks convictions and the imposition of penalties. This prosecutor operates in close proximity to the courtroom, usually arguing in court or negotiating a plea. Faced with a large volume of potential cases from across the jurisdiction, the prosecutor carefully chooses which are worthy of her effort and screens out cases with inadequate evidence or less serious violations. The usual metrics of her success are the rates of declination and conviction and the length of sentences.
In the past two decades, an alternative strategy of prosecution, called community prosecution, has emerged, and some commentators see it as "a paradigm shift in the area of criminal justice" (Gray, 2008) and "a revolution in crime fighting" (Doolan, 2002) . The alternative approach requires individual prosecutors to take responsibility for specific geographic target areas. It typically involves deploying prosecutors directly in the community, identifying the community's public safety concerns by developing close relationships with neighborhood groups, and employing solutions that prevent crime ex ante rather than relying solely on prosecutions to punish it ex post.
Some prosecutors have been quick to apply the community prosecution approach. Attorney General Eric Holder was an early adopter of the strategy when he was U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia in the 1990s (Coles, 2000, p. 31) . In recent years, the Department of Justice has given dozens of grants to local prosecutors' offices to plan, implement, and improve community prosecution programs (Goldkamp et al., 2002) . According to one commentator, "community prosecution is going to be part of the future trend in prosecution in the US" (Gramckow, 1997, p. 22) . These developments parallel a growing interest among legal academics in the possibilities for devolving authority in the criminal justice system to local officials, including but not limited to prosecutors, and in improving the responsiveness of decision-makers to local constituencies. Among the aspirations of greater local control is a reduction in the frequency and racial disproportion of incarceration (Lanni, 2005; Stuntz, 2011; Bibas, 2012) .
Despite its growing popularity, little is known about the effects of community prosecution. Existing studies have focused on the manner of its implementation with particular attention to organizational changes within the prosecutors' office. 1 There These policy changes are studied using a panel comprising annual observations of police beats over the period 1995 to 2011. To preview the main results, community prosecution appears to reduce certain categories of crime: murder, rape, and aggravated assault. Estimated declines for burglary and motor vehicle theft are socially meaningful but at the cusp of statistical significance. Other observed reductions, such as for robbery and disorderly conduct, are too imprecisely estimated to support firm statistical inferences. The impacts also vary widely by office, suggesting that community prosecution's effectiveness may depend on the manner of implementation.
The results imply that, on average, community prosecution as practiced in Cook County is cost-justified. Given the range of practices under the rubric of community prosecution, the paper's analysis does not speak to whether the results observed here generalize or could be replicated elsewhere. But the paper's estimates are the first evidence that community prosecution can, under circumstances which are not yet fully understood, lead to cost-justified reductions in crime. The paper's analysis also contributes to the larger literature on prosecutorial behavior. It represents the first examination of whether prosecutorial decision-making affects crime rates and the first cost-benefit analysis of prosecutorial behavior.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.1 describes in more detail the elements of the community prosecution approach generally, and Section 2.2 turns to the details of Chicago's experience with community prosecution. Section 3 describes the data analyzed and the empirical strategy employed. Section 4 presents the results, and Section 5 concludes with a discussion of the implications and directions for future work.
Community Prosecution

Defined
Community prosecution encompasses a wide variety of approaches, making an authoritative definition elusive. A touchstone of community prosecution is its contrast with the traditional model of prosecution under which mostly reactive prosecutors devote their energies to the use of adversarial legal process (Jacoby, 1980) . In the traditional approach, which is sometimes called the "case processor" approach, a prosecutor picks which cases to pursue from a portfolio of arrests and investigations assembled by police. The prosecutor is resource-constrained in that she cannot prosecute all violations of the law that police have detected, and she must choose a small subset for prosecution. Prosecutorial discretion in this setting consists of weighing factors, such as the seriousness of the offense, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the equal treatment of similar defendants, in deciding whether to prosecute, whether to offer a plea bargain, and how generous that bargain should be. The success of traditional prosecutors is usually assessed with metrics such as the rates of cases pursued, percentage of convictions obtained, and average sentence lengths. Indeed, most of the empirical literature on prosecutors has focused on these outcomes (Coffee et al., 1984; Boylan, 2005) . The economic model of prosecutors, which imagines expected sentence lengths as the objective of their constrained optimization, draws heavily upon the traditional account (Landes, 1971; Reignanum, 1998) .
Community prosecution contrasts with the traditional approach in that it seeks to involve neighborhood residents in identifying local public safety priorities and in developing and implementing strategies to address them. It also emphasizes efforts to prevent crime ex ante rather than relying exclusively on ex post punishments. The community prosecution strategy does not offer a fixed set of programmatic initiatives or organizational and managerial changes for securing community engagement. Instead, it is "an evolving strategy" (Coles, 2000) that permits tailoring to specific contexts. "The different models of community prosecution efforts ... make it difficult to describe what community prosecution actually means and what it looks like" (Gramckow, 1997, p. 9) . Some commentators see this flexibility as a basis for criticism; that community prosecution is without "a coherent vision" and is "lacking in structure, even chaotic" (Thompson, 2002, pp. 324, 360) . 3 Also, this flexibility makes the evaluation of "community prosecution" as a strategy difficult, because the combination of policies it represents likely varies from application to application. Any estimates of community prosecution's impact, however well identified, may not have external validity.
Despite these limitations, several functionally and geographically specific changes to prosecutorial work are paradigmatic of community prosecution. The first element is the definition of a target area, the set of neighborhoods or a geographic territory that are the subject of the change in prosecutorial strategy. One or more prosecutors are often designated as the "community prosecutors" for the targeted area, and their workload is shifted to consist largely or exclusively of matters arising from the targeted 3. Attempts to enumerate the ways in which community prosecution breaks with the traditional prosecution model have produced different tallies of its key elements (Gramckow, 1997 (three) ; Coles, 2000 (four) ; Goldkamp et al., 2002 (seven elements); Gray, 2008 (six) ). The difficulty in defining community prosecution also makes measuring the extent of its use challenging. Nugent-Borakove (2004a , 2004b surveyed prosecutors' offices to learn the frequency with which they engaged in six "core elements" of community prosecution. She found that nearly all offices adopted more than one but fewer than five elements. Cunningham et al. (2006) analyzed the incidence of community prosecution using the 2001 National Survey of Prosecutors. They found that the number of forms of community engagement a prosecutor's office undertook increased with the size of the prosecutor's office and with other measures of specialization in the office. neighborhood. Often, the community prosecutor is located in an office within the target neighborhood rather than in the central courthouse. The purpose of a local office is to facilitate communication with the community and even to permit residents to walk in and voice concerns directly to prosecutors.
The community prosecutor learns the neighborhood's priorities and enlists its support primarily by developing relationships with various neighborhood associations, such as business, school, and resident groups. Representatives of these organizations are sometimes assembled into a formal advisory board, and the board may also include representatives from other governmental units, such as the police and social welfare agencies. While the community prosecutor receives information and advice from the board, she retains final decision-making authority. When a community prosecutor selects a case for prosecution, she may take responsibility for shepherding it through all steps of the criminal process, from indictment to trial and sentencing, rather than specializing in handling many cases at a single stage of the criminal process.
Community prosecution's emphasis on preventing rather than punishing crime typically implies that a community prosecutor often attempts to address broader causes of offending rather than relying exclusively on criminal prosecutions to reduce crime. Examples are nuisance suits and civil enforcement of local health and safety ordinances in order to close drug houses. A community prosecutor may attend or even help design youth intervention programs. Occasionally, she may mediate disputes in the neighborhood. Frequently, she employs her knowledge of and access to other agencies to marshal resources and coordinate governmental responses to problems identified by the community.
Advocates of community prosecution generally leave undefined the goals that the restructuring of prosecutorial work is intended to accomplish. 4 The conventional metrics for evaluating prosecutors are qualitative, such as fidelity to law, fairness and good judgment in selecting cases, zeal and acumen in pressing cases, and decency in extending leniency. Yet, community prosecution's emphasis on public safety makes crime rates plausible metrics of its performance.
Community prosecution, like community policing, originated in the "broken windows" theory of Wilson and Kelling (1982) , a theory that sought to explain the increases in crime rates during the 1960s and 1970s (Harp et al., 2004; Wolf, 2010; Klitzing, 2012) . According to the "broken windows" theory, visible signs of public disorder, such as unrepaired windows and graffiti, and unchecked incidents of petty 4. Community prosecution may also provide publicity benefits for the lead prosecutor who is usually an elected official. But this is unlikely to be the sole or main objective. Community engagement may increase the risk of unfavorable publicity if it raises expectations that cannot be met. crime, such as loitering and vandalism, communicate the message that violations of the law occur with impunity. The disordered environment leads to more serious offending. The theory translated into at least two specific policy proposals: community policing and community prosecution. To date, cities have been quicker to adopt some form of community policing. 5 Most prominently, New York adopted "order maintenance" policing strategies that emphasized "zero tolerance" of certain misdemeanor offenses such as subway fare-jumping. The "broken windows" theory and the policing policies it inspired are now contested in a vigorous academic debate. 6 "Broken windows" thus offers one potential mechanism through which community prosecution may affect crime rates: tamping down on quality-of-life offenses may prevent petty crimes from escalating into serious ones.
Yet, there are other potential mechanisms through which community prosecution could influence crime. From an economic perspective, community prosecution may facilitate the acquisition of more accurate information and thus allow a more effective allocation of prosecutorial resources. It may do this in several ways. The placement of a prosecutor, who was previously located in a remote courthouse, in the neighborhood may lower a resident's cost of providing information. Residents may perceive prosecutors as more trustworthy than police and thus may be more forthcoming. Residents and even local beat officers may have greater confidence that a prosecutor focused on the neighborhood rather than mass-processing a large volume of cases is more likely to act upon any information provided. Several types of information may be provided, such as residents' preferences for enforcement or problem-solving efforts, the types of crimes 5. By 1999, 64% of local police departments had full-time officers engaged in some form of community policing (Hickman and Reaves, 2001) . Numerous scholars have noted the connections between community policing and community prosecution. For example, Stuntz (2011, p. 305) wrote, "Gradually, something akin to the community policing movement has begun in the realm of prosecution. 'Community prosecution' has not transformed the work of prosecutors' offices, as community policing has done for many urban police forces. But the core idea -more neighborhood democracy, and a more politically responsive style of law enforcement -is the same." Also, Wright (2012, p. 361) observed, "Some efforts to strengthen the connection between prosecutors and the public use the rubric of 'community prosecution.' These initiatives draw on general concepts developed in the now-mature 'community policy' movement."
6. Several studies have contested the connection between order maintenance policing and lower crime rates. Levitt (2004) pointed out that crime in New York began its decline before the shift in policies. Harcourt and Ludwig (2006) contested that Kelling and Sousa's (2001) claim that New York's aggressive misdemeanor arrest policies. They argue that it's mid-1990s crime drop is more properly interpreted as mean reversion following the crack cocaine epidemic a decade earlier. Harcourt and Ludwig (2007) found no relationship between misdemeanor marijuana arrests and serious crime in New York. Finally, Fagan and Davies (2000) demonstrated that the "stop and frisk" practice, which was part of New York's order maintenance strategy, had a disparate racial impact. that are particularly disruptive to the neighborhood, and the identities of individual offenders who pose the greatest danger.
Community prosecution is also a form of decentralization that gives individual prosecutors leeway to experiment with different solutions in an entrepreneurial manner. Having acquired new information, the prosecutor may use it in several ways. She might use it to marshal governmental and community resources to change the neighborhood conditions in ways that reduce the risk of crime. Or, she may target resources against particular offenders to ensure their incarceration. Each of these strategies might reduce serious forms of crime immediately without affecting the incidence of qualityof-life crimes. These strategies require the prosecutor to draw upon interpersonal and leadership skills that might go unused in more traditional prosecutorial work. Community prosecution may, therefore, make better use of the types of human capital that a jurisdiction's prosecutors possess. Despite its origins in "broken windows" theory, community prosecution may affect crime through numerous other mechanisms.
Community Prosecution in Chicago
The primary criminal prosecutor in Chicago is the State's Attorney for Cook County, Illinois, who employs about 860 lawyers, constituting the second largest prosecutor's office in the nation. In the late 1990s, the State's Attorney embraced the community prosecution approach and over the next six years, opened offices (calling them "community justice centers") in five target areas. Each office had responsibility for handling cases within a specific geographic territory covering several police districts. 7 Chicago has twenty-five police districts, and each police district, in turn, comprises an average of eleven police beats. Figure 1 presents a map with the boundaries of Chicago's police districts, and districts within the target area of a community prosecution effort at any time during 1995-2011 are shaded.
Each community prosecution office was assigned two experienced prosecutors, who exclusively handled matters concerning the target community rather than taking cases from across the county. The more junior of the two prosecutors served an eighteen-month rotation in the community prosecution office and focused mainly on misdemeanor cases and lesser felonies. The more senior prosecutor handled serious felony cases and was permanently assigned to the community prosecution office. Each office had a steering committee consisting of business, religious, advocacy, and citizen groups that met monthly and advised prosecutors of the community's public safety concerns, but the prosecutors retained final decision-making authority. The work of the community prosecutors was substantially different from that of 7. The material in this paragraph is drawn from Repella (2010) . traditional, case-processing prosecutors. They devoted part of their time to forms of crime prevention and problem-solving that did not involve prosecutions, such as mediating disputes between neighbors and participating in school intervention programs.
When bringing prosecutions, they selected very specific cases. Each week, they combed police lists of arrests occurring in the neighborhood and targeted repeated offenders with the aim of incapacitating the small number of offenders responsible for many crimes. In choosing cases, they placed greater weight on a suspect's history of arrests than a traditional prosecutor might. When not looking to arrestee lists, they took input from the steering committee and tried to identify cases that would have a large impact on quality-of-life in the community. Sometimes, this objective led them to target serious offenses, such a repeat armed robbers, and at other times, minor offenses. In bringing a case, the community prosecutor coordinated with police and informed the judge during an initial hearing that the case was a specifically selected community prosecution. In so doing, the prosecutor may have elicited closer attention from the police and court for the case. Each community prosecution office produces annually an internal report for the State's Attorney detailing the specific activities and community engagement efforts undertaken and describing the major prosecutions that were brought and how they were resolved. Cook County's approach thus included all of the paradigmatic elements of community prosecution: targeting specific geographic areas, engaging the community, responding to the problems identified, collaborating with other agencies, altering prosecutorial priorities, and restructuring the work of prosecutors.
The community prosecution effort continued in Cook County until early 2007 when a budget crisis caused termination of the program, including closure of all neighborhood offices. For more than two years, no community prosecution efforts occurred. In 2009, a new State's Attorney who had campaigned partly on a promise to reinvigorate the community prosecution strategy took office (Abernathy, 2008) . During the next three years, she re-opened the four community prosecution offices having target areas within the city of Chicago. 8 Table 1 shows the locations, target police districts, and dates of each community prosecution office. By December 2011, 38.7% of Chicago police beats fell within a community prosecution target area, and 37.2% of Chicago's population resided in a police beat that was part of a community prosecution target area.
Data
The data analyzed in the paper are a panel of Chicago's police beats covering the years 1995-2011. Information on crime rates was gathered from two sources. The city of Chicago reports information on all criminal incidents since 2001 (City of Chicago, 2011), and these criminal incidents were aggregated into annual, beat-level tallies. For the years 1995-2000, the author obtained beat-level data on crimes from the Chicago Police Department.
In the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports, there are three major groupings of offenses: violent crimes consisting of murder, rape, aggravated assault, and robbery, and property crimes consisting of burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft; the third category, known as part II offenses, consists of less serious offenses, and they include 8. A fifth office in Maywood, Illinois, was not re-opened, but its target area did not fall within the city of Chicago. non-aggravated assault, arson, vandalism, weapons offenses, drug offenses, prostitution and sex offenses (other than rape), crimes against family members and children, and disorderly conduct. These offenses are categorized as less serious than violent and property crime, and they are less often studied. But, they are examined here because an important justification of community prosecution is the prediction from the "broken windows" theory that enforcement of minor offenses prevents the spread of more serious crime.
Information on the population and demographic characteristics of the beats were taken from the decennial censuses of 2000 and 2010 and were linearly interpolated to obtain annual values. A small number of police beats had very low populations, such as those encompassing O'Hare Airport, making their crime rates exceedingly noisy. These beats were removed, leaving 279 beats in the sample. Consequently, the main data set was an annual panel of 279 police beats from 1995 through 2011, which had 4,743 (= 279 beats × 17 years) observations. Table 2 shows means and standard deviations of the main variables stratified by whether the police beat ever fell within a community prosecution target area. The two groups of police beats are similar along some dimensions but differ across others. Their median incomes and proportion of their populations that were adults are nearly identical. They contrast in their population sizes and racial and ethnic compositions. The populations of police beats that eventually fell within a community prosecution target area were smaller by about 14%. The share of their populations that were black was higher by 13 percentage points and the share that was Hispanic was lower by 5 percentage points. The State's Attorney did not articulate the criteria for selecting target neighborhoods, and it seems unlikely that randomization was the selection device. A cynical possibility is that the State's Attorney attempted to assure an appearance of the initiative's success by choosing neighborhoods where crime was already lower. The means in Table 2 cast doubt on this possibility. The police beats receiving community prosecution coverage had slightly higher crime rates than other police beats. These beats had 3% more (log) violent crime, 1% more (log) property crime, and 2% more (log) part II offenses per capita than other beats. The means in Table 2 show that the community prosecution was not systematically applied to police beats where crime was already lower. Instead, the average beat chosen for the strategy had slightly more severe crime problems.
Estimation Strategy
To control for the multiple influences on crime rates, regressions were estimated using ordinary least squares. Each dependent variable took the form ln C it , the (logged) rate of a given offense category in beat i and year t. The main equation for the impact of community prosecution was
where the terms α i and α t are fixed effects for beat i and year t, respectively. The term θ i captures the influence of a beat-specific time trend, although specifications without this term are also reported. The vector X it contains a set of beat-and year-specific control variables that are commonly included in crime analyses: the percent of the population that is black, Hispanic, and aged over 18; the percent of female-headed households; and (the log of) median household income. All of the variables in X it are calculated from linearly interpolated measures from the decennial censuses. For beats that had no crimes in a given year, the log crime rate is set to zero, and the observation is permitted to have a separate intercept (Pakes and Griliches, 1980) . The indicator variable Community Prosecution Open it takes the value of 1 when beat i falls within the target area of community prosecution office that is active in year t. In years when the community prosecution effort was commenced or terminated, its value is the fraction of months during which the neighborhood office was open, and otherwise, its value is 0. The coefficient δ DD is the differences-in-differences estimate. In later specifications, more elaborate functions are used to measure the community prosecution policy, such as separate indicators for each community prosecution office.
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The error term is ε it . Bertrand et al. (2004) showed that when outcomes are serially correlated, standard errors from differences-in-differences estimators may be inconsistent. In addition, the community prosecution strategy affects multiple police beats, raising the possibility that common group errors may bias estimated standard errors downward (Moulton, 1990) . Accordingly, two sets of standard errors, one clustered at the level of police beats and the other clustered at the level of police districts, are reported for each regression coefficient. Table 3 reports differences-in-differences estimates for the major categories of offenses: violent, property, and part II. Each cell of the table contains an estimated δ DD coefficient from a separate regression. Each row reports estimates for a different dependent variable, and the columns vary the right-hand side specification, progressively including a richer set of controls. The estimates in column (1) include only fixed effects for years and for police beats. The fixed effects for years control for citywide trends in crime rates, and the fixed effects for police beats control for unobserved beat characteristics that are fixed over time. To control better for observable differences across police beats, the regressions in columns (2) include the set of demographic and income characteristics of beats that are shown in Table 4 and that prior literature has shown to correlate with crime. 9 The estimates in columns (1) and (2) may suffer from omitted variable bias if crimefighting policies or criminological conditions changed contemporaneously with the implementation of community prosecution. 10 To address this, the regression in column (3) introduces linear time trends for each police beat, which eliminates variation in crime rates caused by factors that vary linearly over time and that are specific to individual police beats. Identification of the impact of community prosecution in these 9. Specifically, the control variables included are those reported in Table 4 : the median income in each police beat, the percentage of female-headed households in the beat, and the percentage of the population in the police beat that is black, Hispanic, and under age 18.
Results
Baseline Estimates
10. For example, if police deployments correlated with community prosecution, the estimates would reflect the combined effect of police and prosecutor behavior. Unfortunately, the city refuses to release information on police deployments at the district level (let alone the beat level), citing risks to police operations and officer safety (Miahalpoulos, 2011) . equations comes from within-beat variation in community prosecution after netting out beat-specific linear trends. Table 3 shows that the crime categories vary in their sensitivity to the regression specification. For all of the categories, clustering standard errors at the district level implies substantially less precision in the estimates, but as more control variables are added to the regressions, the standard errors tighten. Also, the inclusion of beat-specific trends moves all of the point estimates in a negative direction. For violent crime, all of the estimated coefficients have negative signs, and their magnitudes imply that community prosecution produced socially meaningful drops in this category of crime. When the regression includes beat-specific time trends, the point estimate is nearly −0.07 and statistically significant even when the standard errors are clustered by police districts.
The estimates for property crimes move in a progressively negative direction as the regression specification becomes more demanding. In the parsimonious specification of column (1), the estimate for property crimes is 0.017, but the inclusion of controls for demographics and income levels lowers it to almost 0. When beat-specific trends are added to the regression in column (3), the estimate falls to −0.033. In contrast, the estimated coefficients for part II offenses remain positive. Yet, even here, the addition of beat-level trends to the regression causes the estimates to fall from 0.045 to 0.018. The fact that the estimates for all three crime groupings are more negative (or closer to 0) in the presence of beat-specific trends suggests that crime trends moved in the Table 3 and are weighted by the population of the police beat.
opposite direction to the activation of community prosecution offices. Taken at face value, these estimates are consistent with the hypothesis that community prosecution may modestly increase the reporting of quality-of-life crimes. In sum, Table 3 shows that when the analysis accounts for trends within each police beat, community prosecution appears to reduce violent crime and perhaps property crime and that any increase in part II offenses is small. These estimated responses to community prosecution raise questions about the mechanism through which it affects crime. The "broken windows" theory predicts that if unchecked, visual clues will trigger an escalation in the frequency and seriousness of offending. If the community prosecution strategy operates through a "broken windows" mechanism, quality-of-life crimes should decline prior to the drops in more serious offending. The estimates in Table 3 are precisely opposite of this prediction. Violent crimes, which are commonly thought to be the most serious, experience the largest and statistically significant declines following the introduction of the community prosecution strategy. The estimated drop in property crimes is smaller in magnitude and statistically insignificant, and quality-of-life crimes, as measured by part II offenses, experienced a statistically insignificant increase.
A second prediction from "broken windows" theory is that any effects on crime may take time to manifest. Small disorders lead to larger ones and ultimately to serious crimes. The effect of community prosecution should, therefore, grow over time. To test this prediction, the variable for active community prosecution coverage was decomposed into a series of binary variables for the number of years, since the strategy was implemented in a police beat. In addition, indicator variables for the years prior to the application of community prosecution strategy were included to assess the time path of crime rates in such beats immediately before the implementation of the strategy. Figure 2 shows these coefficients and their 95% confidence intervals for the three major crime categories. 11 When the community prosecution variable is decomposed in this way, none of the estimates are statistically significant, and thus, these results provide impressionistic evidence of the dynamics of community prosecution.
Again, the results are contrary to the "broken windows" prediction. Figure 2a and b show that the declines in violent and property crime are immediate and stable. Within the first year of introducing the strategy, the point estimates for violent and property crime are each about −0.04, where they remain for the next four or five years. Even the modest rise in part II offenses, occurring during the third and fourth years after the implementation of community prosecution, appears transitory. By the sixth year, the point estimate for part II offenses has returned to its initial level. The patterns in Figure 2 suggest that community prosecution as implemented in Cook County did not influence crime through the mechanisms hypothesized by "broken windows." Figure 2 also shows whether the police beats where community prosecution was introduced had sharply different crime rates in the three years prior to its implementation than other police beats. Consistent with Table 2 , average rates of violent and part 11. The 95% confidence intervals were calculated with standard errors clustered on police districts. Table 3 and are weighted by the population of the police beat. Standard errors are clustered by police district.
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Alternative Specifications
To probe more deeply the relationship between crime rates and community prosecution, Table 4 presents three alternative specifications. Panel A considers the possibility that community prosecution may merely displace crime rather than reduce it. If displacement was the impact of the strategy, criminal activity might relocate beyond the boundary of a community prosecution district. The regression in Panel A tests this prediction by including an indicator variable for each police beat that was adjacent to an active community prosecution district. If displacement were the cause of the observed declines in crime, the coefficient for a police beat adjacent to an active target area should be positive. Panel A shows that for every crime grouping, it is negative and statistically insignificant. For violent and property crimes, the estimated coefficient is about −0.03, and for part II crimes, it is very close to 0. The estimates for an active community prosecution effort are robust to the inclusion of this border variable. In fact, the declines in violent and property crime appear slightly larger and more precisely estimated in the presence of the border variable. These results suggest that displacement was not primarily responsible for the drops in crime where community prosecution was implemented.
Panel B of Table 4 reports coefficients from regressions in which the indicator for an active community prosecution office was replaced with separate indicators for each of the four offices with target areas within the city of Chicago. The consistency of the estimates for violent and property crime is remarkable. Three of the four estimates for violent crimes fall between −0.087 and −0.112, and three of the four for property crimes lie within −0.025 and −0.091. A conclusion from these results is that the presence of an active community prosecution office most often produced sizable declines in rates of violent and property crime.
Yet, the estimates also show that within each crime category, the impact of community prosecution varied by as much as 11 percentage points across the offices. For example, each office's estimated impact on violent crime was negative, but the point estimates range from −0.007 (on the north side) to −0.112 (on the west side). Similarly, the estimates for part II offenses ranged from 0.080 (on the west side) to −0.012 (on the north side). There are numerous potential explanations for the variation in the estimated impacts across offices, and these data do not permit direct tests of by guest on August 13, 2015 http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/ them. Particular offices may have prioritized different categories of offenses, perhaps in response to specific community preferences. Individual prosecutors in the offices may have exerted greater efforts, either generally or with respect to particular types of offenses, or they may have possessed greater talent for eliciting community support. The effect of community prosecution may be heterogenous, varying with unobserved neighborhood characteristics such as the engagement of community groups.
The results in Panel B also alleviate concerns about the endogeneity of the community prosecution strategy. If the State's Attorney prioritized neighborhoods where community prosecution was most likely to succeed or where crime was already declining, then offices that were opened (and re-opened after 2007) earlier should have experienced the largest crime declines. Panel B shows that, if anything, the opposite was true. Community prosecution appears to have exerted a modest effect on crime rates on the north side, and yet, its office was the first to open and to re-open after the 2007 shutdown. The west-side office was the third in the sequence of both openings and re-openings, and yet, its point estimates reveal that it had the largest declines in both violent and property crimes. These findings discount the possibility that the State's Attorney prioritized districts where community prosecution would have the greatest observable impact.
The implementation of community prosecution in Chicago consisted of two discrete episodes. The first episode began in the late 1990s and ended with the sudden shut-down in early 2007, and the second episode began in mid-2009 with the re-opening of several offices and continued until the end of the observation period. The closures in 2007 offer the advantage of abruptness and the likelihood that they were exogenous to the performance of individual offices. The State's Attorney closed all the offices as a budget-cutting measure rather than a selective trimming of less successful offices. A potential disadvantage of this source of variation is that it occurred simultaneously across all offices, making it difficult to distinguish from other contemporaneous changes that may affect crime. For example, the deterioration in general economic conditions may have affected crime rates (Raphael and Winter-Ebmer, 2001; Gould et al., 2002) , and the State's Attorney's budget-cutting measures included terminations of dozens of prosecutors who were not assigned to community prosecution (Abernathy, 2008) . The openings and re-openings of community prosecution have the advantage that, in both episodes, these transitions occurred at different dates over three years. This staggered pattern of reactivation allows the impact of community prosecution to be more plausibly disentangled from citywide contemporaneous trends. But, the post-activation period in the second episode of community prosecution is relatively brief, providing fewer data points in which to observe its effect.
Panel C of Table 4 reports a specification in which the single indicator for community prosecution is split into two variables, one for the first episode and one for the by guest on August 13, 2015 http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/
Downloaded from
Community Prosecution 21 second episode. Within each crime category, the estimates for each episode bear the same signs. None of the estimates for the second episode are statistically significant, in part because their standard errors are larger. The sizes of the estimated coefficients for property crimes are similar (−0.0332 and −0.0297). In contrast, both violent and part II crimes feature estimates that are larger (in absolute value) during the first episode of community prosecution. Despite this difference, the estimates from both episodes point to similar conclusions about the impact of community prosecution on crime.
Particular Offense Categories
The community prosecution strategy does not offer ready predictions about the crime categories it is likely to affect. As it seeks to incorporate the community's public safety concerns, community prosecution allows flexibility to target a wide range of offenses. To understand better which offenses community prosecution affected in Chicago, Table 5 presents estimates for each specific crime category.
The estimated coefficients for each of the violent and property crime categories imply declines. Some reductions are substantial, such as for murder, rape, and burglary. Perhaps, the most impressive is the statistically significant decline of nearly 8% in aggravated assault, the offense that, in most years, constitutes more than half of all violent crimes. The estimates for offenses in the part II category are less consistent. Some offenses, such as disorderly conduct and arson, show large but imprecisely estimated declines. Other offenses, including the most common ones in this categorydrugs, weapons, and non-aggravated assault-appear unaffected by community prosecution. Still other offenses, including prostitution and the miscellaneous category, show increases in response to community prosecution.
These results provide further evidence that "broken windows" was not the operative mechanism of community prosecution. There is no consistent decline in crimes related to the maintenance of public order. While the point estimate for disorderly conduct implies a substantial drop, that for non-aggravated assault implies no meaningful impact. The conflicting signs and magnitudes of the estimates for the part II offenses contrast sharply with the persistently negative point estimates for the offenses in the violent and property categories.
Another possible implication of "broken windows" is that community prosecution engages residents, raises expectations of public order, and increases their willingness to report offenses to police. If so, community prosecution should prompt an increase in the reporting of "victimless" crimes that affect public order but that require third parties to inform police of them. The results in Table 5 do not provide consistent support for this prediction. The point estimate for prostitution is positive, while that for drug crimes is very close to zero. Table 3 and are weighted by the population of the police beat.
Discussion and conclusion
The regression estimates indicate that community prosecution in Chicago caused sizable reductions in murder, rape, and aggravated assault. Estimated drops in robbery, burglary, and motor vehicle theft were socially meaningful but statistically insignificant. To place the estimated effects of community prosecution in context and to assess whether it is a cost-justified policy, monetary values can be attached to the estimated crime reductions and the cost of implementing the policy. The costs of community prosecution in Chicago consisted of opening of a local office, the assignment of two by guest on August 13, 2015 http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/ Making the generous assumption that an experienced prosecutor earns a salary of $75,000 and that other employment benefits raise this cost by a third, the cost of two experienced prosecutors is roughly $200,000. Rents are likely to vary widely in the city, and rough estimate for office space and a support staffer may be an additional $200,000. 12 This brings a reasonable cost estimate for a community prosecution office to $400,000 per year. Table 6 translates the estimated crime reductions into monetary values. Column (1) reports that the average annual incidents per target area that the estimates in Table 5 imply were prevented by community prosecution. Only averages for the offense categories having estimates statistically significant at the 10% level or better are shown. To reflect the degree of uncertainty in the estimates, column (2) reports the estimated reductions implied by the upper bound estimates of the 95% confidence interval. (As the point estimate here is negative, the upper bound estimate is the bound closest to zero.) Columns (3) and (4) contain two sets of recent estimates of the social cost of individual offense categories: McCollister et al. (2010) , which tallies direct and direct 12. In fact, the State's Attorney paid no rent on any of the neighborhood community prosecution offices in Cook County. The use of each of the office spaces was donated by local landlords.
by guest on August 13, 2015 http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/ costs, and Cohen et al. (2004) , which uses a willingness-to-pay measure. It is immediately apparent that under either set of estimated crime reductions and under either cost estimates, community prosecution was cost-justified. Although this is a ballpark calculation, the benefits appear to exceed the costs by several multiples. This analysis is, of course, incomplete. It leaves out important potential benefits, such as improvements in residents' perceptions of public safety, and potential costs, such as longer periods of incarceration for specific neighborhood offenders.
Another key limitation is that these results may not generalize to other applications of community prosecution. A wide range of practices fall under the banner of community prosecution, and if other jurisdictions employ a different combination of prosecutorial activities, similar declines in crime may not be achieved. Despite this weakness, the paper's findings are an important advance. They demonstrate for the first time that community prosecution can be implemented in a way that produces cost-justified reductions in crime.
The results also provide insight into the mechanisms through which community prosecution can reduce crime. The theoretical foundation for community prosecution, like its more prominent sibling movement, community policing, was "broken windows" theory. That theory predicts community engagement affects quality-of-life offenses initially and later influences more serious crimes. The concentration of the estimated crime declines in the most serious offense categories and the immediacy and stability of those declines are not consistent with that prediction. The findings thus contribute to the literature that casts doubt on the mechanisms hypothesized by "broken windows." 13 The results also point to directions for future research. The paper's findings are likely the first evidence showing that the organizational structure of prosecutors' offices and the tasks to which they allocate their energies can affect the incidence of crime. Prosecutors are often described as the most powerful decision-makers in the criminal justice system, and it is surprising that more is not known about how their choices affect public safety. With respect to community prosecution, the differencesin-differences estimation approach employed here does not isolate the precise mechanism through which the strategy lowered crime in Chicago. Future research should attempt to measure the specific tactics deployed by community prosecutors-whether 13. Harcourt (1998 Harcourt ( , 2001 ) criticized the primary statistical evidence for the disorder-to-crime link of "broken windows," Skogan (1990) cross-sectional study of New York neighborhoods. Harcourt showed that after correcting for missing values or controlling for neighborhood characteristics, many types of offenses do not correlate with measures of public disorder. Also, Sampson and Raudenbush (1999) used highly detailed data on the visual appearance of public spaces in neighborhoods to show that there was no correlation between disorder and crime. it is targeted prosecutions, dialogue with community groups, mediation or other problem-solving efforts that do not involve prosecution, or something else-and link these practices to the responses in crime.
